

CHAPTER  
**18**

GUIDED READING *The Cold War Heats Up*

Section 2

**A.** As you read this section, fill out the chart below by writing answers to the questions in the appropriate boxes.


	Civil War in China	Civil War in Korea
1. Which side did the United States support, and why?		
2. What did the United States do to affect the outcome of the war?		
3. What was the outcome of the war?		
4. How did the American public react to that outcome, and why?		

**B.** On the back of this paper, explain the significance of each of the following terms and names:

**Mao Zedong    Chiang Kai-shek    Taiwan (Formosa)    38th parallel**

**Sequencing**

**A.** Complete the time line below by describing the key events of the Korean War.



**Finding Main Ideas**

**B.** Answer the following questions in the space provided.

1. What was the reaction in America to the Communist takeover of China?

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2. Why did President Truman fire General MacArthur?

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3. How did the stalemate in Korea impact the U.S. political scene?

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## Section 2

**PRIMARY SOURCE** *from Douglas MacArthur's Farewell Address to Congress*

*President Truman's dismissal of General MacArthur as Commander of the UN forces in Korea sparked debate in Congress over Truman's strategy of fighting a limited war in Korea. MacArthur was asked to address a Joint Session of Congress as part of the congressional investigation into this issue. What follows is an excerpt of MacArthur's speech in which he defends his position. As you read his speech, pay attention to the reasons he gives for expanding the war and decide whether you agree with him.*

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, and distinguished members of the Congress:

I stand on this rostrum with a sense of deep humility and great pride—humility in the wake of those great American architects of our history who have stood here before me, pride in the reflection that this forum of legislative debate represents human liberty in the purest form yet devised. Here are centered the hopes, and aspirations, and faith of the entire human race.

I do not stand here as advocate for any partisan cause, for the issues are fundamental and reach quite beyond the realm of partisan consideration. They must be resolved on the highest plane of national interest if our course is to prove sound and our future protected. I trust, therefore, that you will do me the justice of receiving that which I have to say as solely expressing the considered viewpoint of a fellow American. I address you with neither rancor nor bitterness in the fading twilight of life with but one purpose in mind—to serve my country. . . .

I now turn to the Korean conflict. While I was not consulted prior to the President's decision to intervene in support of the Republic of Korea, that decision from a military standpoint proved a sound one as we hurled back the invaders and decimated his forces. Our victory was complete and our objectives within reach when Red China intervened with numerically superior ground forces. This created a new war and an entirely new situation—a situation not contemplated when our forces were committed against the North Korean invaders—a situation which called for new decisions in the diplomatic sphere to permit the realistic adjustment of military strategy. Such decisions have not been forthcoming.

While no man in his right mind would advocate sending our ground forces into continental China,

and such was never given a thought, the new situation did urgently demand a drastic revision of strategic planning if our political aim was to defeat this new enemy as we had defeated the old.

Apart from the military need as I saw it to neutralize the sanctuary protection given the enemy north of the Yalu, I felt that military necessity in the conduct of the war made mandatory:

1. The intensification of our economic blockade against China.
2. The imposition of a naval blockade against the China coast.
3. Removal of restrictions on air reconnaissance of China's coast areas and of Manchuria.
4. Removal of restriction on the forces of the Republic of China on Formosa [Taiwan] with logistical support to contribute to their effective operations against the common enemy.

For entertaining these views, all professionally designed to support our forces committed to Korea and bring hostilities to an end with the least possible delay and at a saving of countless American and Allied lives, I have been severely criticized in lay circles, principally abroad, despite my understanding that from a military standpoint the above views have been fully shared in the past by practically every military leader concerned with the Korean campaign, including our own Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I called for reinforcements, but was informed that reinforcements were not available. I made clear that if not permitted to destroy the buildup bases north of the Yalu; if not permitted to utilize the friendly Chinese force of some 600,000 men on Formosa [Taiwan]; if not permitted to blockade the China coast to prevent the Chinese Reds from getting succor from without; and if there were to be no hope of major reinforcements, the position of

the command from the military standpoint forbade victory. We could hold in Korea by constant maneuver and at an approximate area where our supply line advantages were in balance with the supply line disadvantages of the enemy, but we could hope at best for only an indecisive campaign, with its terrible and constant attrition upon our forces if the enemy utilized his full military potential.

I have constantly called for the new political decisions essential to a solution. Efforts have been made to distort my position. It has been said, in effect, that I am a warmonger. Nothing can be further from the truth. I know war as few other men now living know it, and nothing to me is more revolting. I have long advocated its complete abolition as its very destructiveness on both friend and foe has rendered it useless as a means of settling international disputes. . . .

But once war is forced upon us, there is no other alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end. War's very object is victory—not prolonged indecision. In war, indeed, there can be no substitute for victory.

There are some who for varying reasons would appease Red China. They are blind to history's clear lesson; for history teaches with unmistakable emphasis that appeasement but begets new and bloodier war. It points to no single instance where the end has justified that means—where appeasement has led to more than a sham peace. Like blackmail, it lays the basis for new and successively greater demands, until, as in blackmail, violence becomes the only other alternative.

Why, my soldiers asked of me, surrender military advantages to an enemy in the field? I could not answer. Some may say to avoid spread of the conflict into an all-out war with China; others, to avoid Soviet intervention. Neither explanation seems valid. For China is already engaging with the maximum power it can commit and the Soviet will not necessarily mesh its actions with our moves. Like a cobra, any new enemy will more likely strike whenever it feels that the relativity in military or other potential is in its favor on a worldwide basis.

The tragedy of Korea is further heightened by the fact that as military action is confined to its territorial limits, it condemns that nation, which it is our purpose to save, to suffer the devastating impact of full naval and air bombardment, while the enemy's sanctuaries are fully protected from such attack and devastation. Of the nations of the

world, Korea alone, up to now, is the sole one which has risked its all against communism. The magnificence of the courage and fortitude of the Korean people defies description. They have chosen to risk death rather than slavery. Their last words to me were, "Don't scuttle the Pacific."

I have just left your fighting sons in Korea. They have met all tests there and I can report to you without reservation they are splendid in every way. It was my constant effort to preserve them and end this savage conflict honorably and with the least loss of time and a minimum sacrifice of life. Its growing bloodshed has caused me the deepest anguish and anxiety. Those gallant men will remain often in my thoughts in my prayers always.

I am closing my fifty-two years of military service. When I joined the Army, even before the turn of the century, it was the fulfillment of all my boyish hopes and dreams. The world has turned over many times since I took the oath on the plain at West Point, and the hopes and dreams have long since vanished. But I still remember the refrain of one of the most popular barrack ballads of that day which proclaimed most proudly that—

Old soldiers never die;  
they just fade away.

And like the old soldier of that ballad, I now close my military career and just fade away—an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty.

Good-by.

*from The 82nd Congress, 1st Session, House Doc. No. 36*

## Discussion Questions

1. What parts of this speech excerpt do you find the most persuasive? the least persuasive?
2. What do you think MacArthur's attitude in this speech is? To get a sense of his attitude, try reading parts of the speech aloud as you think he might have delivered it. Then, cite words and phrases from the speech as evidence to support your opinion.
3. After its investigation, Congress failed to agree on whether to continue Truman's policy of a limited war in Korea. If you had been a member of Congress at the time, how would you have voted? Cite evidence from your textbook, as well as from MacArthur's speech, to support your opinion.

CHAPTER  
**18**

AMERICAN LIVES

# Douglas MacArthur

## *Flashy, Career Soldier*

Section 2

*“When I joined the Army, even before the turn of the century, it was the fulfillment of all my boyish hopes and dreams.”—Douglas MacArthur in his farewell address to Congress (1951)*

Born to a Civil War hero and career officer, Douglas MacArthur grew up on military bases and spent almost his whole life in the Army. He was egotistical, a flashy dresser, and a self-promoter. Another officer once said that MacArthur’s father “was the most flamboyantly egotistic man I had ever seen—until I met his son.” MacArthur was also a superb officer—in the words of General George Marshall, “our most brilliant general.”

MacArthur (1880–1964) succeeded through intelligence, hard work, and self-confidence instilled by his mother. As he prepared for the entrance exam for West Point, she told him, “You’ll win if you don’t lose your nerve. You must believe in yourself, my son, or no one else will believe in you.” He outscored all competitors.

During World War I, MacArthur won a name for bravery in battle. He was also known for his non-regulation dress, which included a long scarf wrapped dashing around his neck.

In 1935, he was loaned to the Philippines to build an army. MacArthur relished the chance to organize the force—and to design his own uniform—as field marshal in the Philippine army. In mid-1941, President Franklin Roosevelt recalled MacArthur to active duty and gave him command of U.S. forces in the Philippines.

MacArthur’s troops were trapped when the Japanese attacked in late 1941. In March 1942, MacArthur and his troops managed to escape to Australia, thereby providing the American people with a hero when they needed one. MacArthur declared, “I came through, and I shall return.” Characteristically, he did not say that “we”—the United States—would return.

It took two years, but MacArthur did return by pursuing an effective island-hopping strategy. He held casualties down by invading less-well-defended islands. He made effective use of bombers. Finally, in October 1944, U.S. forces landed on the Philippines. MacArthur bravely came ashore the same day and had his picture taken wading ashore. He told the

Philippine people, “I have returned! . . . Rally to me!”

After the war, MacArthur led the American occupation of Japan. He helped demilitarize the country and his staff wrote a new constitution that included democratic reforms. The Japanese people appreciated his efforts.

When North Korea invaded the South in 1950, the situation was dire. MacArthur, placed in command of UN forces by President Harry Truman, planned a brilliant campaign—the invasion of Inchon, a port on the west side of the Korean peninsula behind enemy lines. Navy officers urged against it, as there were logistical problems with the landing site. At a meeting, MacArthur urged approval of the plan: “I can almost hear the ticking of the second hand of destiny. We must act now or we will die. . . . We shall land at Inchon and I shall crush them.” The plan was adopted, and MacArthur was proven correct. American spirits soared as apparent defeat had turned to victory. However, MacArthur and President Truman began to disagree on war strategy, and MacArthur publicly disputed him. Then, in early 1951, just a few months after the Inchon landing, Truman shocked the nation by recalling—firing—MacArthur.

After Truman removed him from command, MacArthur was invited to speak before Congress and given a ticker-tape parade in New York. MacArthur hoped to run for president in 1952, but the Republicans turned to another general—Dwight Eisenhower. MacArthur lived the remainder of his life in uncharacteristic quiet.

## Questions

1. What kind of image do you think MacArthur wanted to project?
2. MacArthur lived outside the United States from 1937 to 1951. What effect might that have had on his relations with Truman?
3. Why might Eisenhower have been more appealing as a presidential candidate than MacArthur?